Constraining Digital Craftspersonship<\/span><\/h2>\nWe now turn our attention to exploring several exemplars where Digital Craftspersonship is being detrimentally impacted via centralised control and lock down. These examples illuminate how commercial or political motivations are able to leverage constraints in order to restrict how today’s computerised objects function, and how our 5-layer model helps capture nuances in this command-and-control that are currently not well explicated.<\/p>\n
Networks: Forced scarcity<\/h3>\n
The unique architecture of the Internet allows the interconnection of hundreds of millions of networks around the world and supports a plethora of applications and protocols. This network layer architecture demonstrates how a common open Internet Protocol (IP) facilitates the connectivity of numerous networks, while supporting diverse functionality and offering widespread interoperability (Deering, 2001; Burns, 2003; Zittrain, 2008). The Internet\u2019s end-to-end design principle supports applications on the edges of networks and was posited as a break from traditional mainframes and their centralised control (Saltzer et al., 1981). For the first decades of the Internet, this open architecture was a marked departure from the centralised control of telephony in which control over wireline infrastructure was used to restrict what devices users connected to their phone lines or how mobile operators charged orders of magnitude different prices for the transfer of bits for telephony vs. simple messaging service (SMS) traffic. However, network operators have been systematically moving away from these open, decentralised norms and introducing artificial scarcity to the flow of information. As a result, these same operators are able to monetise specific uses of applications, services, or communications, leveraging control over networks to limit functionality on higher layers of the stack.<\/p>\n
As the explosion of innovations utilising unlicensed Wi-Fi exemplifies, access to electromagnetic spectrum allows for network craftspersonship by facilitating enormous new avenues for tinkering and developing innovative edge technologies (De Filippi and Tr\u00e9guer, 2014). Utilising two small bands of unlicensed spectrum, at 2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz, Wi-Fi has not only expanded the reach of Internet access, but also the business models used for broadband service provision, from distributed mesh networks spanning entire cities to in-home audio distribution systems. A 2014 study by Telecom Advisory Services estimated that Wi-Fi contributed US$ 222 billion to the U.S. economy (Katz, 2014); however, despite the massive potential of increased unlicensed spectrum, over 95% of the public airwaves in the United States (under 30 GHz) are either reserved for governmental use or licensed to private parties, and largely sit unused [End Note #1]. Despite the development of spectrum-sharing and cognitive radio technologies, the regulatory approach to spectrum has remained mired in early 20th Century thinking, resulting in the creation of massive artificial scarcity. Given severely limited access to the public airwaves and the increasing ease of access to software-defined radios, contemporary radio innovators are likely to become electromagnetic jaywalkers who are technically breaking the law, yet highly unlikely to be prosecuted.<\/p>\n
Furthermore, in contrast to the open and flexible use of Wi-Fi, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are increasingly seeking ways to leverage their control over network resources to introduce false scarcity over Internet communications. The most recent example of which is the implementation of broadband caps on broadband service\u2014in essence, limiting how much data a customer can transfer in a given period of time in order to create new pricing tiers based upon customers having to pay for the maximum amount of data they might ever use. Effectively, this represents a shift in billing structure for broadband service from a flat rate to usage-based pricing (though users are rarely refunded for using less than their allotment).<\/p>\n
The use of data caps impose a false scarcity on data networks and is neither dependent on network costs, nor used for reasonable network management. Ostensibly, the use of data caps serve as a remarkably blunt instrument to reduce overall usage of a network\u2019s capacity resources and encourage customers to purchase or retain television services. In reality, data caps are an explicit effort to create a scarcity of bytes, impact the types of services customers use via their Internet connections, and commercialise services that otherwise would not gain market share by explicitly excluding them from data cap metering. Minne (2013) argues that data caps on wireline Internet access are intended to ensure that users can \u201ccomplement, but not replace, traditional subscription TV services,\u201d which makes sense when so many ISPs are bundling TV and Internet services. The average American watches nearly 35 hours of television a week (Nielsen, 2014). With medium quality stream of Netflix transfers of about 700 MB each hour, the average viewer would watch over 100 GB of standard definition video a month; when one looks at high definition (HD) quality content, that usage number can increase by well over 300%. In July, 2011 Bell executive Mirko Bibic admitted: \u201cNo single user or wholesale customer is the cause of congestion\u201d (Lasar, 2011), yet at the same time, the reason given to the regulatory authority for the continuance of this business practice was ostensibly to reduce network congestion. Then, in 2013, Michael Powell, the former Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman who went on to become president of the National Cable and Telecommunications Association, acknowledged that the function of data caps was monetisation of traffic (Bishop, 2013). A survey of ISPs globally found 45% of companies offer at least one application that does not incur data charges, and the specifics of these deals differ between ISPs (Morris, 2014).<\/p>\n
At the same time, ISPs are entering private arrangements with content providers and applications that would let those services bypass data caps\u2014a business practice often termed \u201czero rating\u201d (because use of that service has zero impact on your broadband usage meter). This practice is increasingly prevalent with mobile operators who otherwise restrict data use to under 10 GB a month. In the U.S., AT&T launched a \u201cSponsored Data\u201d programme to allow partners, such as game development companies and advertisers, to offer free content to their customers (AT&T, 2014); meanwhile, T-Mobile offers free data for certain music applications (T-Mobile, 2014). However, the implications for Digital Craftspersonship is the establishment of a new barrier for new market entrants. Data caps coupled with zero-rating completely undermines network neutrality and end-user control over what content they wish to consume by creating content tiers and complex (hidden) pricing structures. And yet, this growing practice does not, as of the June 2015 FCC rules, run afoul of existing U.S. law. Internationally, this practice is rapidly growing (although, in 2014, Chile announced that zero-rating would not be allowed; in April 2015, India announced that zero rating would be frowned upon\u2014and in February 2016, that it was an illegal practice) (Meyer, 2014; Wall, 2015; Hempel, 2016).<\/p>\n
Data caps present a number of policy challenges that are currently being discussed at the FCC and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the U.S., and serve as deterrents to universal broadband adoption, thus conflicting with federal efforts to increase broadband adoption. Likewise, data caps directly undermine the shift toward cloud-based (as opposed to local\/desktop) computing by creating additional de facto tariffs for data transfers (and potentially resulting in overage charges or even the disconnection of services) (Singel, 2011). Additionally, data caps suppress the use of broadband connections for accessing over-the-top video services like Netflix and YouTube (and any other bandwidth-intensive service or application), presenting a potential barrier to competition that deserves additional scrutiny when ISPs are already offering their own video content. However, the FCC continues to allow this rent-seeking business practice (Brodkin, 2015) and mobile data caps are becoming normalised in Europe and the U.S.<\/p>\n
Devices: From coffee makers to John Deere tractors<\/h3>\n
The widespread introduction of standardised personal computers in the 1980s helped make computing more accessible. Pre-packaged, standardised components meant users no longer needed to solder their own boards and created a platform supporting a market for third-party software that could run on these new platforms (Zittrain, 2008). And for much of the past 30+ years, PCs have been a neutral medium that would run whatever software they were capable of running and connect to whatever network you plugged them into. However, as the following examples underscore, in recent years, while computational capacity has been built into an array of consumer devices, these new digital ecosystems have become vectors of control, rather than interoperability, extensibility and craftspersonship.<\/p>\n
Two cases illustrate how computers can control everyday objects like coffee makers and tractors, both of which use the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as means to justify severe limits on how consumer goods can be used. Introduced in 1998, the DMCA made circumventing digital rights management (DRM), regardless of the intention of this circumvention, illegal (Lessig, 2002). When applied to consumer goods, this effectively redefines ownership of everything from vehicles and coffee machines (i.e., just because you own that device, no longer grants you the right to do with it as you please), making even something as obvious as fixing something that is broken a potential felony.<\/p>\n
During the 1990s, Green Mountain Coffee Roasters collaborated with Keurig to sell a single-serve, pod-based coffee brewing machine, a partnership that facilitated both hardware and coffee pod (k-cup) sales. Green Mountain Coffee Roasters experienced remarkable growth and ended up purchasing Keurig. Meanwhile, the sale of brewers and k-cups more than tripled in recent years, from earning US$ 1.2 billion in 2010 to US$ 4 billion by 2014 (McGinn, 2011; Dzieza, 2015). The popularity of the pod-based brewing system allowed Green Mountain Coffee Roasters to license the pod to other coffee roasters, while other coffee companies sold pods independently. However, in 2014, Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, renamed Keurig Green Mountain, integrated DRM into the 2.0 version of their k-cups. These new machines included an infra-red scanner that would detect special ink markings on Keurig coffee pods and would cause the machine to actually fail to work if users attempted to brew \u201cunlicensed coffee pods\u201d in these \u201cnew-and-improved\u201d Keurig machines (Dzieza, 2014). By incorporating DRM, Keurig leveraged its control over your coffeemaker to restrict the downstream market of coffee.<\/p>\n
The release of DRM coffee proved to be a poor business decision, in part because Keurig 2.0 machines not only locked out competitors coffee pods, but also Keurig\u2019s own 1.0 pods (and the Keurig refillable pod), resulting in a steep decline in sales (Dzieza, 2015). In May 2015, following a 10% decline in share price, Keurig acknowledged the error in forcing consumers to purchase single-use pods and announced a plan to brew unlicensed coffee brands (Geuss, 2015). However, their change of heart was laced with language that would seem to undermine the initial \u201cwin\u201d (Barrett, 2015)\u2014Keurig is not planning to remove the DRM, but rather, to make licensing of DRM-equipped k-cups more widespread (Kline, 2015). Ensuring that your choice of coffee will be prescribed, not solely by your own proclivities, but mediated through the licensure practices of the manufacturer of our coffee maker. Meanwhile, most consumers remain completely unaware that their coffee machines are being built to prescribe what coffee you can brew in them.<\/p>\n
Keurig is far from the only company seeking to incorporate DRM and use copyright protection measures as a means to control the sale of add-on services or products. For example, new tractors, such as those from John Deere, lock end-users out of making repairs or modifications via both technical limitations and end-user acceptable use policies. Likewise, more and more new cars have Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that prescribe everything from powertrain operations to the battery management. Access to the ECU software is required to run diagnostics on the computer controlling your car engine and for modifying the car to achieve better gas mileage. However, these types of modifications\u2014the digital variation of tinkering on your own car\u2014are illegal on many of these vehicles.
\nAs Benkler writes, the result is that the DMCA favours \u201cgiving the copyright owner a power to extinguish the user\u2019s privileged uses\u201d (Benkler, 1999: 421). Although the U.S. Copyright Office conducts a triennial review of DMCA exemptions, companies actively defend their locked-down products and, in doing so, insist consumers do not fully own what they have purchased (Bartholomew, 2015; Lightsey and Fitzgerald, 2015). John Deere defends their own practices by arguing that consumers who purchase their tractors \u201ccannot properly be considered the \u2018owner\u2019 of the vehicle software\u201d (Bartholomew, 2015). General Motors also states that end-users merely license the software running their car (Lightsey and Fitzgerald, 2015). While the traditional mechanical craftsperson could repair their own tractor, the 21st Century farmers are increasingly prevented by law from doing so.<\/p>\n
Applications: WWW vs. Facebook<\/h3>\n
In 1990, Tim Berners-Lee began distributing his innovative new scheme to \u201clink\u201d pages of content over a shared computer network. His work, including the now-ubiquitous hypertext transport protocol (HTTP), became the foundation for the World Wide Web. Offered without patent or fee for use, HTTP and HTML allowed digital craftswomen to develop webpages for news, video sharing, search and social media. The Web became the \u201ckiller application\u201d for the Internet\u2014the essential application that drove mainstream adoption. However, as with any powerful tool, the liberatory potential for the application is often concomitant with an equally oppressive potential trajectory. While Mosaic and later graphical web browsers like Netscape, Internet Explorer, Firefox and Chrome make the Web accessible over the open Internet, applications can also constrain the user experience in both obvious and remarkably subtle ways.<\/p>\n
In 2010, Facebook launched Facebook Zero, a text-only zero-rated walled garden used by partnering telecom carriers. Over the next three years, 10% of Facebook\u2019s billion+ active users used FaceBook Zero (Russell, 2013). In August 2013, Facebook launched Internet.org, a zero-rated application whose initial goal was \u201cto make Internet access available to the two-thirds of the world who are not yet connected, and to bring the same opportunities to everyone that the connected third of the world has today\u201d (Facebook, 2013). Internet.org was a partnership with Facebook, Ericsson, MediaTek, Nokia, Opera, Qualcomm and Samsung and first rolled out with Airtel in Zambia in 2014 (Cooper, 2014).<\/p>\n
However, the Internet.org app is very different that the Internet and the Web. While the World Wide Web offers a range of accessible information limited only by the pages end users create, the Internet.org application reduces the network stream to a trickle and offers only a limited range of pages and applications. In Zambia, the services bundled in the launch included AccuWeather, Go Zambia Jobs, Wikipedia, and Facebook. These pages offer services to users, but are such a limited set of options that they more resemble channels on cable television, rather than anything even approaching the Internet. Furthermore, this limited set of services is not even the same as the non-zero-rated versions and fails to provide the same generative potential that Zittrain ascribes to the Web (Zittrain, 2008). Internet.org is an application-based portal to information channels, an Internet experience mediated by a corporate consortium, rather than end users themselves. This is the obvious difference, but it is also the case that Facebook on Facebook Zero is actually different than the Facebook people experience when they access the platform over uncensored Internet connections. Unbeknownst to most people, Facebook Zero\u2019s Facebook is actually stripped of much of its rich content (e.g., pictures, videos)\u2014making for a resource-poor variant that, by Facebook\u2019s own estimate, is passed off to hundreds of millions of the world\u2019s poor as \u201cseparate, but equal\u201d.<\/p>\n
In May 2015, Mark Zuckerberg, co-founder of Facebook and Internet.org, announced the launch of an Internet.org platform that would allow developers to offer pages or services via a zero-rating Facebook Zero platform. Opening Internet.org is widely seen as positive step to providing more connectivity to users; however, channelling the \u201cInternet\u201d experiences of the world\u2019s poor through a gatekeeper application is not a good option for expanding Digital Craftspersonship\u2014it is more of a bait-and-switch business practice that will eventually leave billions on the wrong side of a new, subtle, but very real, digital divide whereby the range of functionality offered by their Internet service is a pale approximation of what many of the world’s richer constituencies have.<\/p>\n
Not all countries have given Internet.org a positive reception. Facebook launched Internet.org (later rebranded as \u201cFree Basics\u201d) in India in February 2015 through a partnership with Reliance Communications (Facebook, 2015). At launch, the service provided access to 38 websites and services in six Indian states. Following this rollout, Kiran Jonnalagadda, founder of HasGeek, a hacker convening in Bangalore, India, helped launch a campaign to oppose Internet.org in India. The #SaveTheInternet campaign directed participants to email the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) regarding their questionnaire \u201cRegulatory Framework for Over-the-top (OTT) services \/ Internet services and Net Neutrality\u201d. In response to the growing public outcry, in April 2015, Indian companies began pulling out of Internet.org and TRAI asked Reliance Communications to cease offering Free Basics in December 2015 (Doval, 2015). The final trajectory of Facebook’s Free Basics is still unknown, but what is clear is that there is no current plan to offer actual Internet connectivity.<\/p>\n
Content: Remixes and political speech<\/h3>\n
Networked technologies have supported new paradigms of information dissemination, including what Castells describes as mass-self communication, and the growth of independent content producers (Castells, 2010). The role of individual content production has is an important evolution in collective action and contentious political debate (Bimber et al., 2012; Bennett and Segerberg, 2013; Milan, 2015). From YouTube to Tumblr, and from SoundCloud to WordPress, a host of websites and services support individual uploads of self-produced images, text, videos and multi-media, creating a rich environment of personal, yet publicly-hosted information that is now a dominant component of people’s everyday Internet use. However, commercial motivations and legal mandates are exerting more and more influence on how these websites are built, and are rapidly shifting individuals’ \u201cownership\u201d over their postings to central control over people’s personal content.<\/p>\n
The DMCA, which John Deere and GM are using to restrict even the most basic device-level craftspersonship on \u201cowners’\u201d vehicles, actively restricts access to key diagnostic software and even includes a framework for removing personal content from websites. Under the DMCA, U.S.-based websites can be held liable for hosting copyrighted material if the offending material is not removed after receiving an infringement claim, and most online forums abide by these take-down notices, even when they are clearly bogus or otherwise target perfectly legal content. In essence, take-down is automatic, with creators of content \u201cguilty until proven innocent\u201d.<\/p>\n
The DMCA is most often used by automated \u201ctake-down notice mills\u201d that are creating millions of notices with next to zero fact-checking for fair use (and other safe harbours) and often are almost always complied with with no actual human review. As Seltzer writes, \u201cThe DMCA safe harbors may help the service provider and the copyright claimant, but they hurt the parties who were absent from the copyright bargaining table\u201d (Seltzer, 2010: 177). And this doesn\u2019t just impact \u201cthe little guys\u201d. During the 2008 U.S. Presidential elections, Republican nominee Senator John McCain had videos removed from YouTube, including content from newscasts that were removed after YouTube received DMCA from news organisations (Sohn and McDiarmid, 2010). In April 2015, U.S. Senator Rand Paul announced his candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination in the United States. His announcement video was automatically removed by YouTube\u2019s copyright Content ID system because the video included clips from John Rich\u2019s 2009 song Shuttin\u2019 Detroit Down (Bump, 2015). And even professor Lawrence Lessig has had YouTube videos of his lecture explaining examples of fair use removed via take-down notice that wrongfully claiming copyright infringement (Andy, 2014).<\/p>\n
The DMCA has also been abused in efforts to silence critique. Benkler describes how ATM and election machine manufacturer Diebold forced students at Swarthmore University to remove emails that documented the company’s internal concerns over the security of their voting machines (Benkler, 2006). A decade later, in 2015, News Corp. sent a DMCA request to First Look media including an image of the front page of the Sunday Times in a critique of an article published on that news site (Mullin, 2015).<\/p>\n
By contrast, open content can be remixed. For example, an Anonymous cell in Hamburg Germany shared a 2010 video raising concerns about the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement under a Creative Commons license specifically to avoid DMCA takedowns of later adaptations or mirrors (Losey, 2014). Around the globe, Creative Commons is being utilised as a licensing framework that allows content creators to choose to retain some rights, while granting permissionless rights to others, such as reuse or remixing. The license ensured that mirrored uploads of the original Anonymous mashup were perfectly legal (Anonymous Germany, 2012); but even then, DMCA is often used to erode this obvious legal protection. For example, in 2012, NASA uploaded video of their Mars Rover landing on Mars. NASA\u2019s video is public domain and was also used by commercial news services, one of which then issued a DMCA takedown request on NASA\u2019s original upload (Pasternack, 2012). Indeed, law professor and Creative Commons co-founder Lessig acknowledges the licensing system is \u201ca step to rational copyright reform, not itself an ultimate solution\u201d (Lessig, 2008: 279).<\/p>\n
Cultural production, including remixing, is a craft requiring modest technical acumen, but well pre-dates the Internet. Artists certainly also created and shared audio and video in the pre-YouTube era. For example, Swedish remix artist Johan S\u00f6derberg started his \u201cRead My Lips\u201d series of videos editing clips of world leaders to look like they are singing pop songs as a form of political critique beginning in 2001 (McIntosh, 2012), and the popular satirical news programme The Daily Show frequently uses reappropriation of news commentary and statements. From fandom, such as Anime Music Videos (Knobel and Lankshear, 2008; Ito, 2010), to political appropriation (McIntosh, 2012), and participation in memes (Castells, 2012; Bennett and Segerberg, 2013), content production allows individuals to participate in shared communities and cultural dialogue.<\/p>\n
The extent that the Internet can support individual cultural production has been a crucially important component of digitally-mediated political deliberation, both through individual action and as an organising tactic. The \u201cWe are the 99%\u201d meme helped grow Occupy Wall Street protests in New York into a global cultural phenomenon. Bennett and Segerberg describe how the Occupy meme \u201cquickly traveled the world via personal stories and images shared on social networks such as Tumblr, Twitter, and Facebook\u201d (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013: loc. 742). Ganesh and Stohl (2013) documented how the Occupy frame inspired complimentary protests as far away as Wellington, New Zealand. Wolfson (2014) describes how a commitment to open-content publishing and journalism created the foundation of the Indymedia movement, which was the first global foray into citizen journalism that utilised both new digital media production technologies and the Internet as a content-distribution system and open publishing platform. Developing digital literacy to participate in community offers educational opportunities (Knobel and Lankshear, 2008); however, copyright regimes that overstep their legal bounds and often utterly ignore fair use to maximise profits are also stifling freedom of expression and create unnecessary (and occasionally illegal) restrictions to Digital Craftspersonship.<\/p>\n
Data: Creation and control<\/h3>\n
With the growth of the Internet of Things, networked data collection is rapidly moving beyond an individual’s web browsing habits to include a far more panoptic range of devices and behaviours, encompassing everything from wearable fitness trackers like Fitbit, to refrigerators and vehicles. Today, farmers are beginning to use GPS mixed with local field data to automate their tractors (Lowenberg-DeBoer, 2015), and this data is, in turn, being collected by the manufacturers of these tractors for unknown purposes. While collecting and utilising these data can create new economic opportunities and open doors for new innovations, with the locus of control over these data often well outside the hands of the users and owners of these services and devices, these tools are often used to commercialise, rather than empower, digital craftsmen.<\/p>\n
In June 2015, fitness tracker device company Fitbit had their initial public offering at US$ 20 per share. Through its wearable fitness device, Fitbit sells the consumer a service: the ability to track data about one\u2019s movements and activities. This service is quite valuable, and currently Fitbit dominates this sector with roughly an 85% market share. By the closing bell on its first day of trading, Fitbit\u2019s shares had increased 50%, achieving a US$ 6 billion market capitalisation on its first day of trading (Driebusch, 2015). Clearly, data collection, processing and sales have created significant economic opportunities and incentives for control.<\/p>\n
In 2013, Jeff Leak, an assistant professor in biostatistics at John Hopkins University, began experimenting with his Fitbit data. He quickly realised that his Fitbit was collecting minute-by-minute data; however, access to these data was unavailable to him, but actually limited to Fitbit’s business partners (Leek, 2013). As it turned out, access to his stream is negotiated through third-parties, whose applications are then granted access to Fitbit data streams. Although some digital craftspeople have found that they are able to request personal access by emailing Fitbit (Ramirez, 2014), controlling access to one’s own data stream is often a difficult to impossible proposition. As Fitbit exemplifies, data collected by Internet of Things devices is almost always managed through a command-and-control infrastructure that extracts personal information and stores these data in central repositories controlled by the service\/device\/applications providers, not the user.<\/p>\n
While some form of (usually read-only) access to some of these data is often made available, this access is almost always severely limited, changes over time, and offers an incomplete picture of the extent of tracking these devices are doing. For example, in 2012, Twitter introduced new restrictions on how much data third-party applications could access (Kern, 2012). In doing so, Twitter blocked third-party interfaces, and pushed users to use the official Twitter mobile app, rather than the growing host of more diverse, more user-friendly, feature-rich applications. Likewise, researchers analysing Twitter data were locked out of this newly-exclusive data store as well.<\/p>\n
The monetary value of open data in the EU27 was estimated in excess of US$ 40 billion in 2010, and has grown substantially since then (Tinholt, 2013). Globally, McKinsey estimates that data, in open sharable formats, could generate US$ 3-5 trillion in economic growth (Chui et al., 2013). However, emerging end-user computing devices not only have limited data-access interfaces, but the data they collect is increasingly tethered to the device and centralised proprietary storage systems as well.<\/p>\n
End-user access to data allows individual entrepreneurship, for example, using granular energy use information to maximise the efficiency of electrical use or driving habits\u2014which, as Nest, a connected thermostat offered from Google, exemplifies, is a growing business model (Olson, 2014). The ability for users to access and utilise our own data allows digital craftsmen to develop and share tools that are built on top of this data layer. Additional applications can combine datasets\u2014for example, from smart meters, in-home appliances and control interfaces\u2014to better match usage to budgets and values. End-user applications could also encrypt and locally store data to increase user privacy and security, an obvious solution to the growing problem of centralised data stores being regularly hacked due to inadequate operational security precautions.<\/p>\n
For example, LastPass is a networked password manager that, allows users to login using a master password, rather than dozens of passwords for applications, files and logins across devices. However, because the service centrally stores these passwords LastPass is a honeypot\u2014a desirable target for hackers around the globe. In June 2015, LastPass announced that they had been hacked, and although master passwords are encrypted on user devices locally before being transmitted to a central server, hashes from these passwords were accessed, requiring users to change their master passwords (Siegrist, 2015). Hacks of central data stores are a substantial and growing risk of the Internet of Things. For example, in 2014, Apple\u2019s iCloud service was hacked, leading to the release of nude personal photos of dozens of celebrities; and, in 2012, a Facebook bug enabled some accounts to be accessed without a password.<\/p>\n
Computer security expert, Bruce Schneier, frames the relationship between users and tech companies as \u201cFeudal Security\u201d, a concept that builds upon Meinrath\u2019s theory of digital feudalism (Meinrath et al., 2010). Feudal Security highlights the dependency of end-users on the companies that collect, transmit and store their data (Schneier, 2012). Schneier acknowledges that while Feudal Security reduces the cost of technological individual expertise in exchange for implicit corporate trust, at the same time, corporate-only solutions prevent individuals from taking control over their own data (Schneier, 2013).
\nThe political economy of the Internet incentivises the collection of end-user data (Fuchs, 2011b), and companies collaborate willingly and unwillingly with large-scale law enforcement surveillance (Meinrath and Vitka, 2014). After the revelations of the Edward Snowden leaks, the spectre of a government surveillance system that permeates phone calls, emails and stored data became alarmingly real. The economic fallout includes a German company building a US$ 1.2 billion data centre to avoid using US cloud services, and total losses to the U.S. tech industry could reach 25% of the total industry\u2019s market share (Miller, 2014). At the same time, surveillance is generating a global demand for new, user-friendly, secure communications tools. However, the ability to develop tools that secure the data layer requires end-user control of data transmission and cooperation\u2014ideally permission-free access\u2014of the underlying layers that compose these technology stacks. Enclosing the data created from the Internet of Things in corporate-controlled digital ecosystems severely limits the ability of digital craftsmen to develop meaningfully secure protections over their personal data and, inevitably, leads to a world where more and more private information is placed at severe risk.<\/p>\n
The future of Digital Craftspersonship<\/span><\/h2>\nOver the next decade, the number of networked devices is expected to grow by an order of magnitude. By 2015, the Internet connected over eight billion devices around the globe\u2014more than one per person; Cisco projects that by 2020 there will be 6.5 Internet-connected devices for every person on the planet (Evans, 2011). However, the locus of control over networks, devices, applications, content and data will determine the extent that Digital Craftspersonship will continue to thrive. As postulated by Sennet (2008), building creative solutions are an innate human characteristic; however, the integration of computers into everyday objects do not, by default, encourage this fundamental human drive. As this paper explicates, whether due to financial or political interests, centralised-by-design technological architectures are constraining innovation in ways that are harmful, not helpful.<\/p>\n
The framework we present serves to illustrate that the potential for constraint is not limited to specific actors, but that any actor within the interconnected technologies that supports networked communications technologies, can leverage control over one layer to exert control over the entire technology stack. This paper provides a conceptual model for understanding the Internet of Things as a network of mediated relationships in which the architectures and controls over the corresponding layers of networked systems directly impact the range of freedoms experienced by end users. Each layer offers great potential for innovation, but also concomitant risk when appropriated by centralised, proprietary systems.<\/p>\n
Without regulatory constraints, ISPs will continue to leverage control over network infrastructure to explore new ways to monetise Internet traffic. By definition, these ISPs are constraining how an Internet connection can be utilised (as examples, acceptable use policies that ban home servers or stream video, or exempt a particular service offering from a data cap and discriminating against other functional equivalents). At the same time, the addition of computing technology within a coffeemaker does not guarantee new benefits for consumers, but instead is being used to restrict what types of coffee can be used (a sordid \u201cfunction\u201d that customers are then unknowingly having to pay for in the purchase price of this equipment). Historically, the Internet has been as a platform for permissionless innovation; this paper documents the increasing array of commercialisation tactics that fundamentally reshapes the innovative potential of computer mediated technologies to lock down, control and surveil everyday activities.<\/p>\n
Digital Craftspersonship is an ideal that can serve as a benchmarch for public policy decision making, especially for policy makers that want to promote the Internet as a platform for economic opportunity. Legislation and regulations that impact each layer of a technology stack should be evaluated to determine whether they increase or reduce the potential for craftspersonship. The establishment of network neutrality rules in the United States, and resistance to an application-restricted \u201cInternet\u201d in India, demonstrate positive steps forward for preserving network-layer craftpersonship. However, the use of copyright to shift the concept of \u201cownership\u201d of everyday goods\u2014from cars to coffeemakers\u2014illustrates how companies are exerting control over goods in fundamentally new ways, necessitating updates to traditional consumer protections. Additionally, control of personal information continues to be a growing policy predicament.<\/p>\n
If the agility and independence of any one technology layer is subsumed by dominant market players, the overall economic value of that layer will be dramatically decreased and future innovative potential will be likewise curtailed. A future that protects end-user innovation and the public good must take this into account, especially as we enter an Internet of Things era. This includes the ability to use and innovate without the permission of the network (Lessig, 2002), as well as preventing one layer from foreclosing on the generativity of another (Zittrain, 2008). The extent that corporate control is allowed to encroach upon the potential for Digital Craftspersonship will determine the parameters of \u201cownership\u201d in the 21st Century.<\/p>\n
Entrepreneurs, policy makers and careful and critical observers must look beyond their surface-level understanding of technology and interrogate the technological underpinnings of contemporary and future digital technologies. The overarching positive and negative repercussions of technological innovations are increasingly not silo-ised, but can only be understood in relation to the larger digital ecosystem in which they reside. We provide a parsimonious framework for understanding how the politics within and amongst technological layers of networked systems change the relationship between users, owners and digital technology. This framework focuses on the relationship between users and the networked communications tools they utilise. And the future of Digital Craftspersonship will pit the liberatory potential of new technologies against corporate forces seeking to create feudalistic digital ecosystems; with the outcome determining whether we have the ability to innovate and tinker, or whether we will become digital serfs facing an ever-more-oppressive panoptic and data extractive networked world.<\/p>\n
End Note<\/h4>\n
[1] In cases like the citizens\u2019 band (CB), spectrum is set aside for amateur use, or according to \u201cPart 15\u201d rules that allow some public wireless devices, such as garage door openers and microwave ovens, to operate in unlicensed spectrum. See Bennett Z. Kobb, Wireless Spectrum Finder: Telecommunications, Government and Scientific Radio Frequency Allocations in the US 30 MHz – 300 GHz (McGraw-Hill 2001), and National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency Management (Redbook) (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2008).<\/p>\n
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